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GDP at risk in a DSGE model: an application to 
banking sector stress testing 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 26/2007 
Esa Jokivuolle – Juha Kilponen – Tero Kuusi 




We suggest a complementary tool for financial stability analysis based on 
stochastic simulation of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) 
of the macro economy. The paper relates to financial stability research in which 
financial aggregates crucial to financial stability are modelled as functions of 
macroeconomic variables. In these models, stress tests for eg banking sector loan 
losses can be generated by considering adverse scenarios of macro variables. A 
DSGE model provides a systematic way of generating coherent macro scenarios 
which can be given a rigorous economic interpretation. The approach is illustrated 
using a DSGE model of the Finnish economy and a simple model of Finnish 
banking sector loan losses. 
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Pankkisektorin stressitestaus DSGE-mallin avulla 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 26/2007 
Esa Jokivuolle – Juha Kilponen – Tero Kuusi 




Tutkimuksessa esitetään rahoitusjärjestelmän vakausanalyysia täydentävä mene-
telmä, joka perustuu makrotalouden yleisen tasapainon mallin – ns. DSGE-mallin 
– stokastiseen simulointiin. Menetelmä liittyy rahoitusjärjestelmän vakautta kos-
kevaan tutkimukseen, jossa vakauden kannalta keskeisiä rahoitusaggregaatteja 
mallinnetaan makromuuttujilla. Tällaisissa malleissa pankkisektorille voidaan 
tehdä stressitestejä ennustamalla luottotappioita makromuuttujien epäsuotuisissa 
tulemissa. Yleisen tasapainon makromallin etuna on se, että sillä voidaan tuottaa 
sisäisesti johdonmukaisia makroskenaarioita, joille voidaan antaa perusteellinen 
taloudellinen tulkinta. Menetelmää havainnollistetaan Suomen kansantaloutta 
varten kehitetyllä DSGE-mallilla ja pankkisektorin luottotappioiden mallilla. 
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In recent years central banks and other financial supervisors have become 
increasingly occupied with analysing the stability of the financial system. 
Although there is yet no single commonly accepted definition of financial 
stability, we may say that financial stability prevails when the financial system; 
securities markets, financial institutions, and payment and settlement systems, can 
uninterruptedly service their fundamental functions in the economy. These 
functions include the allocation of savings to real investments via markets and 
institutions, the monitoring and disciplining of firms, and the provision of 
payment and trade settlement services. 
  Financial instability may result from financial distress of individual 
institutions such as large banks or a group of banks, from excessive volatility or 
severe mispricing in securities markets, or from operational failure of payment or 
settlement systems. Although financial stability analysis covers the entire 
financial system it may not be fruitful to separate it from the stability analysis of 
individual financial institutions, many of which alone can cause threats to the 
stability of the system. Therefore macro prudential analysis (aimed at system 
level) often uses, and should use, similar tools and models as prudential analysis 
(aimed at individual institutions). Many tools of financial stability analysis are 
common to, and often originate from, risk management departments of financial 
institutions. Today it is also part of financial supervision, via regulatory 
frameworks such as Basel II, to see that regulated institutions indeed use these 
tools to assess their own risks. 
  It is widely believed that at the core of financial stability lie the solvency of 
the banking sector and especially the solvency of large individual banks. 
Therefore a central part of financial stability analysis consists of models of banks’ 
financial risks; trading risks, credit risks and balance sheet interest rate risks. For 
example, value-at-risk models of banks’ various asset portfolios can be used to 
quantify potential losses that may endanger banks’ solvency.
1 Efforts have also 
been taken to model jointly the risks of various institutions acting in the same 
market in order to incorporate possible contagion effects between institutions. 
Sorge and Virolainen (2006) provide a recent survey of many of the various 
approaches to assessing financial stability. 
                                                 
1 In a standard value-at-risk model a set of risk factors such as market prices of securities or latent 
market risk factors determines the values of instruments in the portfolio under consideration. The 
joint future probability distribution of this set of risk factors is generated through stochastic 
simulation. For each realisation of the factors, changes in the values of the instruments, and hence 
the change in the entire portfolio value (market or book value, depending on the model), is 
determined.  Hence the joint probability distribution of the risk factors can be transformed into the 
probability distribution of the future portfolio value, of which a chosen percentile lying on the 
adverse tail of the distribution measures the ‘value-at-risk’ of the portfolio.  
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  Credit risks still account for a major part of banks’ financial risks; so much of 
financial stability analysis is concerned with credit risk. An important strand of 
credit risk portfolio models aims to incorporate macro economic variables as risk 
factors as adverse macro economic conditions appear to have underlain many 
banking crises.
2 Such models are favoured by supervisors and central banks as for 
them it is particularly important to understand how banks’ credit losses are 
interlinked with macro developments. In Basel II, for example, banks are required 
to conduct stress tests in which their capital adequacy is assessed against potential 
losses in a ‘mild recession’ (Basel Committee, 2005). The models can be used to 
produce ‘macro stress-tests’ in that a potential adverse path of the macro variables 
is fed into the model of, say, bank loan losses to produce a stress scenario of these 
losses. Macro variables could be stochastically simulated to produce their joint 
probability distribution from which the stress scenario could then be chosen. 
Alternatively, the macro scenario could be chosen by using expert judgement. 
Several studies have modelled the relationship between macro economic variables 
and bank credit risk indicators (see eg Sorge and Virolainen, 2006), or imbedded 
the credit risk variables in a macro model (see eg Drehmann et al, 2004, Oung, 
2004, Evjen et al, 2003, and Chirinko and Guill, 1991). 
  In this paper we extend the literature on macro stress-testing by making use of 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) of macro economy. Such 
models have become standard in modern macroeconomics, and there are signs 
that they are also starting to attract economic forecasters, such as central banks.
3 It 
is therefore natural to consider their use also in systematic production of macro 
scenarios for the purpose of financial sector stability assessment. The 
attractiveness of a DSGE model in producing macro scenarios lies in the rigorous 
micro economic foundations it is based on. For a central bank it is also desirable 
to be able to use the same model for producing macro economic scenarios both for 
the purposes of monetary policy and financial stability analysis, in order to 
consolidate and facilitate the dialogue between the two fields of analysis. 
  Our approach is to implement stochastic simulation of a DSGE model.
4 This 
is done by selecting a set of key exogenous variables of the model, running Monte 
Carlo simulation on their joint stochastic processes, and simultaneously solving 
for the new equilibrium of the DSGE model, which gives us paths of the 
endogenous variables of interest. The processes of the exogenous variables and 
their covariances are partly estimated and partly calibrated with the DSGE model 
such that the model produced moments of central macro variables match closely 
their empirical counterparts and stylized facts. The simulated paths of the 
                                                 
2 A pioneering model in incorporating macro factors into a credit risk measurement framework is 
Wilson (1997a, b). 
3 See Kilponen–Ripatti (2006). 
4 The model used is the DSGE model of the Bank of Finland, called ‘Aino’; see Kilponen, 
Kinnunen and Ripatti (2006).  
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variables that are explanatory variables in a chosen bank loan loss model are then 
used to generate loan loss scenarios and, ultimately, the entire probability 
distribution of loan losses.
5 We keep track of the simulated macro scenarios, not 
only of the variables needed in the loan loss model, so that we know what macro 
scenario caused a certain loan loss scenario. This way we are able to provide 
macro economic explanation to the loan loss scenario that lies, say, at the 99th 
percentile of the loan loss distribution. Figure 1.1 illustrates the stages of our 
procedure. 
 
Figure 1.1  Illustration of the approach to produce macro 












loss model  → 
distribution 
of loan loss 
scenarios 
          ↑    
          financial 
variables    
 
 
We note that although we, as much of the literature, talk about stress tests we do 
not mean stress tests in which probabilistic risk assessment models are 
complemented with judgement based scenario analyses. Our approach produces 
the entire probability distribution of the variables of interest, and may hence be 
closer by nature to value-at-risk analysis than standard stress tests. While 
considering ad hoc stress scenarios has its own merits in financial stability 
analysis, the probabilistic approach followed in this paper might be better suited 
for monitoring financial stability developments over time. That is, by fixing the 
probability of the macro scenario considered for generating loan losses, we have 
more control over whether a change in “potential” loan losses from the previous 
stress testing point is really caused by a change in banks’ exposure to macro 
shocks.
6 
  Finally, it should be emphasized that the DSGE model and the bank loan loss 
model are separate in that no feedback mechanisms are considered. An ultimate 
goal in this strand of research might be to incorporate the financial sector in a 
                                                 
5 An auxiliary model of the Finnish banking sector loan losses is estimated in the spirit of Sorge 
and Virolainen (2006). 
6 In practice we rank the macro scenarios, and form their probability distribution, on the basis of 
the GDP growth in each scenario. Using GDP as the metric of scenario severity relates our 
analysis to the concept of GDP at risk which has been introduced by Cecchetti (2006).  
10 
DSGE model.
7 This challenging task is, however, left for future research, and 
therefore the approach in this paper can perhaps best be seen as a pragmatic first 
step in organising the use of a DSGE model in financial stability analysis. 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
DSGE model used, the choice of exogenous variables, and the model calibration. 
In section 3 the stochastic simulation of macro scenarios is implemented. These 




2  The DSGE model and its calibration 
The Bank of Finland’s DSGE model, Aino, is described in more detail eg in 
Kilponen and Ripatti (2005) and Kilponen et al (2006). Here we provide just a 
brief account of its main features. 
  Aino model is cast in the overlapping generations framework and it consists 
of two types of consumers, workers and retirees, and five domestic firm types; 
producers of capital, intermediate and final goods, capital renting firm and 
exporting firm. Consumers make dynamically optimal consumption and labour 
supply decisions by maximizing utility over their life-cycle. There is imperfect 
competition in the labour market and the intermediate goods’ market, but no 
imperfections stemming from financial markets or institutions. Both nominal and 
real rigidities have been introduced to smooth the model economy’s responses to 
economic shocks. There is also a carefully modelled domestic public sector and 
an exogenous foreign sector.
8 The model is closed with fiscal policy rules and UIP 
condition, although in this exercise we replace the UIP condition with monetary 
policy rule, in order to generate endogenous fluctuations of the domestic nominal 
interest rate and capture the covariance of interest, inflation and output observed 
in the de-trended data. 
  In essence, Aino model is a single good model. This composite good is a 
CES-aggregate of individual goods produced by a continuum of identical 
domestic intermediate goods producers. The elasticity of substitution, ie the 
degree of competition between the individual goods may vary over time. The 
production process uses CES technology to combine capital services and labour. 
The composite good is then used as a factor of production of final goods. Model 
has three types of final goods since their relative prices have persistent trends. 
                                                 
7 Christiano, Motta and Rostagno (2007) derive and estimate a monetary DSGE model that 
includes financial markets. In their model, financial markets propagate shocks that originate from 
other than financial markets. Financial markets also act as source of shocks. 
8 The rich public sector module was originally built for analysing specific fiscal policy related 
questions; for financial stability purposes it is considerably reduced.  
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They are consumption goods, capital goods and exported goods. The final goods 
producers are called retailers. They combine the domestic intermediate goods with 
the foreign (imported) intermediate goods.  Importing firms generate only import 
prices. Homogenous capital services are rented from capital goods producers 
(leasing firms). Physical capital stock itself is instantaneously transferable across 
firms. The markets for final goods and capital services are perfect. Intermediate 
goods firms and importing firms operate under imperfect competition and they 
use Calvo pricing with dynamic indexing. 
  Central to our approach is to identify the exogenous factors that are the 
fundamental sources of unpredictable fluctuations and shocks to endogenous 
economic developments such as GDP growth, domestic inflation and real interest 
rates. These economic developments in turn are likely factors influencing 
financial sector vulnerabilities such as bank loan losses. By shocking the key set 
of exogenous factors from their empirically estimated or calibrated joint 





There are a large number of exogenous shock variables in Aino but it is not 
necessary or feasible to include all of them in the version used in our simulations. 
It is important to focus on factors which have been identified as the most potential 
candidates in explaining business fluctuations; a question still very much debated 
in macro economic literature and naturally conditional on the economy in 
question.  For instance, capital-saving technological advances are important in 
explaining the 1990s phenomenon in Finland, whereby, despite rapid growth in 
output, investment recovery was, historically speaking, slow. According to our 
DSGE model, this was because considerably more output was extracted from the 
existing capital stock eg via the rearrangement of working hours. 
  We use a total of 15 exogenous shock variables in the simulation, each of 
which is specified as an AR(1) process with mutually uncorrelated error terms.
9 
The list of the key exogenous shock variables that explain a major part of the 
variation in the model’s key macroeconomic variables is given in Table 2.1, Panel 
B. 
 
                                                 
9 We intend to relax the independence restriction in future work.  
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Table 2.1  Endogenous and exogenous variables 
 
Panel A: Moments of the key endogenous variables 
 
 AR(1)  REL.STD  CORR/Output  S.E. 
Endogenous  variable  Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 
Average labour 
productivity  0.528 0.826 0.777 0.450 0.583 0.507 0.010 0.006 
Output  0.771 0.587 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.013 0.014 
Consumption  0.883 0.504 0.535 0.670 0.142 0.844 0.008 0.009 
Investment  0.886 0.849 2.744 2.467 0.723 0.387 0.036 0.034 
Interest  rate  0.868 0.631 0.481 0.294 0.686 0.598 0.006 0.004 
Real  wage  0.588 0.646 0.729 0.853 0.176 0.156 0.010 0.012 
Employment  0.883 0.504 0.588 0.670 0.632 0.844 0.008 0.009 
Inflation  0.712 0.880 1.474 1.071 0.353 0.048 0.019 0.015 
 
Panel B: Processes of the key exogenous variables 
 
Exogenous shock  AR(1)  S.E. 
Labour aug.technical change  0.71  0.0039 
Capital aug.technical change  0.81  0.0100 
Dom. intermediate goods aug. tech in exports  0.79  0.0412 
Price mark-up  0.95  0.0041 
Imp. intermed. goods aug. tech in capital goods prod  0.9  0.0282 
Dom. intermed. goods aug. tech in capital goods prod  0.78  0.0039 
Imp. intermed. goods aug tech in cons.goods prod  0.76  0.0095 
Competitors relative price  0.56  0.0345 
 
Notes: All exogenous processes are assumed to be AR(1) with uncorrelated errors: 
0 ) , ( corr and ) , 0 ( N ~ ; x x t , j t , i
2
i t , i t , i 1 t , i i t , i = ε ε σ ε ε + α = −  
 
 
There are several approaches to determine the parameters of the exogenous 
variables’ processes and deep parameters of the model. In general, we can divide 
them into following categories. The first contains parameter values that are 
calibrated and not estimated as such. The second set of parameters contains the 
parameters that affect the steady state of the model. These parameters are 
calibrated such as to reproduce some of the key sample averages of the data. The 
third set of parameters consists of parameters that are estimated. Some of these 
parameters have been directly estimated from the Finnish data using GMM and 
Co-integration techniques.
10 Another set of parameters have been estimated using 
a variant of the simulated-moments-method. In essence this means that we aim at 
matching the key moments of the set of the target variables. These target variables 
are indicated in Table 2.1, Panel A. In matching the key moments of the data, we 
apply the same filtering technique (HP-10 000-filter) to actual data and to 
simulated data. The actual data we match runs from 1995q1–2005q4. Filtering 
                                                 
10 A more formal numerical calibration exercise is work in progress.  
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technique is applied both to the actual data and to the simulated data since the 
model’s responses to exogenous shocks are treated as deviations from the 
balanced growth path. 
  The model’s empirical fit is illustrated in Table 2.1, panel A and in figures 2.1 
and 2.2. Panel A in Table 2.1 shows the key moments and standard errors of the 
key macro variables, while Figures 1.1 and 2.3 draw the autocorrelation functions 
and cross-correlations of the key macroeconomic variables to output at different 
horizon. The model’s ability to match the key business cycle moments is rather 
good, albeit it has some difficulties to match the cross-correlation between exports 
and output and in particular employment and output. The model also tends to 
underestimate the autocorrelation of employment, while investment volatility with 
respect to output is somewhat lower in the model when compared with the data. 
Otherwise, given a restricted number of exogenous stochastic shocks used in this 
paper, the model’s fit can be regarded as reasonable.
11 
After the calibration and estimation a variance decomposition of the key 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, private consumption, inflation, interest 
rate and employment was done (see Table 2.2). These 8 variables and their 
stochastic processes are the ones provided in Table 2.1, Panel B. For other 
parameter specifications used in the DSGE model see Kilponen–Kinnunen–
Ripatti (2006). As can be seen from Table 2.2, a major part of the variation in key 
real and nominal macro variables is explained by the variation in labour 
augmenting technical change of the intermediate goods producing firm. The other 




                                                 
11 In order to achieve a reasonable fit with the cross-correlations between interest rate, inflation 
and output growth, the interest rate is assumed to follow a type of Taylor rule. Given that Finland 
is a rather small economy participating in the euro system so that monetary policy can be largely 
considered exogenous, imposing the Taylor rule would be consistent with a view that shocks to the 
Finnish economy are sufficiently symmetric with the euro area shocks.  
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Figure 2.1  Autocorrelation functions of key variables from 
      simulated and actual data 
 













































Notes: Solid lines represent the autocorrelation functions of the model and dashed lines 
represent the autocorrelation functions of the data. Dashed lines with stars indicate the 




Figure 2.2  Correlations between key macroeconomic 
      variables and output at different horizon 
      in the data and in the model 
 









































Notes: Solid lines represent the correlation of respective variables and the output of the 
model and dashed lines represent the same correlation observed in the data. Dashed lines 




Figure 2.3  Simulated probability distribution of the average 
      annual GDP growth rate over a five year horizon 
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Table 2.2  Variance decomposition of key macro variables 
      in the model 
 
Exogenous shock  Labour 
productivity 







Labour  aug.technical  change  83.4  81.5 73.0  13.2  9.9  80.2 58.6 28.0 
Capital  aug.technical  change  1.2  0.8 0.3  1.0  0.2  1.1 0.3 4.8 
Dom. intermediate goods aug. tech in exports  0.5  1.1  0.1  0.7  18.7  0.5  1.6  9.5 
Price  mark-up  2.0  2.4 1.8  13.3  0.5  5.2 8.8 2.2 
Imp. intermed. goods aug. tech in capital 
goods  prod  1.2  1.4 0.8  29.0  0.6  1.1 1.5 3.2 
Dom. intermed. goods aug. tech in capital 
goods  prod  0.5  1.1 0.1  0.7  18.7  0.5 1.6 9.5 
Imp. intermed. goods aug tech in cons.goods 
prod  1.2  1.4 0.8  29.0  0.6  1.1 1.5 3.2 





3  Simulating macro scenarios 
When exogenous shocks hit economy in the DSGE model, GDP growth and other 
variables deviate from their balanced growth path (long-run steady state) but, in 
the case of temporary shocks, start reverting back to the steady state. As the 
DSGE model is forward-looking, responses to shocks take place immediately. 
  Stochastic simulation of the DSGE model proceeds as follows. Let t denote 
the starting period of the simulation. It is assumed that at time t all exogenous 
variables are at their steady state level. At period t+1 realisation of the error terms 
of the exogenous variables are randomly generated from their probability 
distributions and the time t+1 value of the exogenous variables are calculated 
from their respective equilibrium equations (see Table 2.1). The DSGE model is 
then solved for the new equilibrium. In period t+2, random errors for the 
exogenous variables are again generated and the new equilibrium is computed, 
and so on. The simulation is extended over a five-year period; ie to t+20 as the 
DSGE model is calibrated to quarterly data. The resulting stochastic paths of the 
model’s endogenous variables represent the equilibrium responses of the economy 
to the set of unexpected shocks occurring at date t+j. For the illustrative purposes 
of the current paper 1000 such paths were simulated. In each period and for each 
simulation we keep track of the realisations of the endogenous variables which are 
needed both for the bank loan loss model (see section 4) and for describing 
economic developments more broadly in scenarios of interest. 
  In practice, the DSGE model is solved using an algorithm which is freely 
available in a package called Dynare.
12 Dynare also provides the stochastic 
simulation procedure. However, in the solution algorithm the model is linearized 
around the steady state. This may not be desirable for the purposes of prudential 
financial stability analysis which focuses on extreme outcomes because the 
linearization may smooth the outcomes. Non-linear solutions, though available in 
principle, would however be computationally much more time consuming and are 
left for future refinements of our approach. 
  To organise the simulated scenarios we rank them according to the cumulative 
development of the GDP growth over the given time horizon (five years in our 
case). By the same token we can form confidence intervals or the probability 
distribution of the GDP growth. Figure 2.3 depicts the simulated distribution of 
the annual GDP growth rate as an average over the five year horizon. The 
midpoint of the distribution is around 2% growth rate while the worst outcomes 
exhibit an average five-year growth rate of less than 0.5%. Over a five-year period 
this represents quite a poor economic development but, nevertheless, does not 
appear to match a development like the one experienced in Finland in the early 
                                                 
12 See http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.  
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1990’s. This indicates that given the shock processes and the model’s current 
structure and parameter calibration, the current model may not yet be able to 
generate such stress scenarios which have in actuality been experienced in history. 
  Having kept track of the entire set of variables of interest in each scenario we 
may then proceed to ask what happened in the economy in the scenario that 
produced, say, the worst GDP development out of the 1000 simulations; ie in the 
scenario that corresponds to the 99.9th percentile of the GDP growth probability 
distribution over the horizon. Figure 3.1 displays the paths of the various variables 
of interest in this scenario. Panel a draws the realisation of the main shocks 
corresponding to 99.9th percentile scenario. Notice that this is just one example of 
the shock combination that has generated the paths of the model’s endogenous 
variable’s corresponding to 99.9th percentile of the GDP growth probability 
distribution. Of course, there can be a multitude of shock combinations that can 
generate as bad outcomes in terms of GDP growth. In this example, series of 
relatively large and persistent negative realisations of labour and capital 
augmenting technical change of intermediate goods producer firms cause rapid 
deceleration in output growth during the first periods of simulation. These shocks 
are combined with somewhat less important but still sizable negative shocks to the 
production technology of the final good firms. These negative shocks to final 
goods producing firms can be interpreted also as a ‘taste’ shocks that cause a final 
good firms to substitute, say, domestic intermediate goods with imported 
intermediate goods, driving the demand of domestic intermediate goods down 
further. Associated with a negative realisation of capital and labour augmenting 
technical change, there is an eventual increase in inflation, driven by the increase 
of firms real marginal costs. Initial decrease in inflation is due to the initial 
positive technology shock realisations, which feed into inflation slowly due to 
assumed nominal rigidities in price setting of the firms. Furthermore, there is an 
initial decrease in nominal interest rate, which reflects a large drop in output.  
Eventual increase in inflation that is due to persistent negative technology shocks 
contributes also to increase in nominal interest rate towards end of the simulation 
period. Finally, in this particular scenario, negative shocks to word demand of 
exports drive down exports and thus also demand for domestic intermediate goods 
and GDP. Roughly speaking this scenario could feature the events around 1990s 
recession in Finland, although clearly in smaller scale. 
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Figure 3.1  Developments of the various variables in the macro 
      scenario corresponding to the 99.9th worst 
      percentile of the GDP growth distribution 
 








c) Loan loss provisions 
 














4  Macro scenarios and bank loan losses 
Simulation of macro scenarios and generation of the probability distribution of 
GDP growth, carried out in section 3, are interesting in their own right and 
potentially useful as complements to macroeconomic forecasting. However, the 
main motivation for this paper is in how the DSGE simulation can be used in 
financial stability analysis. To illustrate this, our simulation procedure includes a 
model for bank loan losses, which is based on certain endogenous macro variables 
of the DSGE model. The recent Finnish history provides an interesting case, 
previously studied eg by Sorge and Virolainen (2006) and Pesola (2001), as it is 
marked by huge bank loan losses in connection with the banking crisis in the early 
90’s. 
  We estimate the following model for Finnish banks’ loan loss provisions 
using annual data over the period 1986–2005. 
 
LLRt = a0 + a1*LLRt-1 + a2*RIRDt + a3*GDPGAPt-1 (3.1) 
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where LLR is the ratio of loan losses to outstanding loans. The exogenous 
explanatory variables are chosen in the spirit of the DSGE model: RIRD is the 
deviation of real interest rate from its long term level and GDPGAP is the output 
gap, lagged by one year. 
  Table 3 gives the estimation results. All variables are quite significant and 
obtain the expected signs. Partly due to the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable the explanatory power is also very high. When real interest rate is above 
its long term level loan losses tend to be higher. The output gap in turn has a 
negative effect on loan losses; in economic booms loan losses are low. A caveat in 
this type of a linear model is that negative loan losses are also possible. This could 
be a problem especially in the scenario and stress testing type of analysis 
conducted in this paper. Hence further development the loan loss model may be 
needed in the future. 
 
Table 4.1  Banking sector loan loss model 







constant 0,324  0,124  2,61  0,017 
LLRt-1  0,596 0,080 7,470  0,000 
RIRDt  0,068 0,024 2,780  0,012 
GDPGAPt-1  -0,195 0,069 -2,840  0,010 
       
No. of obs.         
R-squared 0,908       
Durbin-Watson 1,320      
 
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the distribution of annual loan loss provisions as an average 
over the five year horizon, obtained by running the loan loss model in each macro 
scenario path simulated in section 3. In contrast with stylized facts of skewed loan 
loss distributions (see also Sorge and Virolainen, 2006), this distribution is quite 
normal. Moreover, it is not very dispersed, with worst case five-year average loan 
loss provisions reaching about 1.5% of total loans. Again, this appears to fall short 
of the Finnish banks’ loan loss experience of the early 90’s. Normality of the loan 
loss distribution is due to the linear specification of the loan loss model and the  
22 
linearization of the DSGE model. Obtaining a more realistic shape for the loan 
loss distribution is an issue we plan to revisit in future work.
13 
 
Figure 4.1  Distribution of the average yearly bank loan loss 
      provisions, as apercentage of total loans, 
      over the five year horizon 
 





















                                                 
13 One way forward could be to consider in the loan loss equation the type of cross-terms used by 
Pesola (2001), in which GDP and interest rate shocks are multiplied by the ratio of aggregate 
indebtedness of the private sector. This aims to capture the effect that the impact of a GDP or an 
interest rate shock on loan losses could be reinforced if the level of prevailing indebtedness is 
sufficiently high. Moreover, the aggregate indebtedness would have to be modelled 
simultaneously, probably as a function of the GDP growth, in order to track its path for the 
purpose of the simulated multi-period loan loss scenarios.  
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have suggested an alternative way to do macro stress tests for 
financial stability analysis; namely, the use of a macro economic dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model to generate macro economic stress scenarios. 
This has been done via stochastic simulation of the DSGE model in order to 
produce the entire probability distribution of, say, GDP growth over a chosen 
horizon, and at the same time tracking the developments in other macro variables 
of interest. The macro scenarios have then been run through a separate banking 
sector loan loss model to produce the probability distribution of aggregate loan 
losses. A particular stress scenario corresponding to a certain tail percentile of the 
GDP growth distribution, and the corresponding loan loss scenario, has also been 
taken under more careful scrutiny. By this we wish to accentuate the analogy 
between our approach and value-at-risk analysis (see also Cecchetti, 2006). 
Thereby one aim of the paper is to advocate a macro stress testing procedure 
which also provides for consistent comparison of risk assessments over time; this 
is achieved by monitoring changes in the loss at a given tail percentile of the loss 
distribution. 
  Our approach has been practical by nature and does not necessarily involve 
new conceptual insights compared to prior literate on macro stress testing (see the 
survey of Sorge and Virolainen, 2006, and the categorisations provided therein). 
Nonetheless, we believe it is useful to complement the arsenal of macro stress 
testing methods by making use of modern macro economic equilibrium models 
which are increasingly attracting the attention of institutional forecasters. For a 
central bank using a DSGE model in its economic analysis and forecasting it is 
particularly natural to utilise it also in financial stability analysis; hence bringing 
the two central areas of central bank analysis closer together and facilitating their 
mutual communication. 
  A number of issues remain in making the approach a better practical tool. For 
instance, the solution procedure of the DSGE model is linearized around the 
steady state. As a result, adverse macro scenarios may become artificially 
smoothed, which is not desirable from the perspective of (macro) prudential 
analysis. 
  Secondly, the macro scenarios in the present approach may be less severe than 
they should be because there are no feedback effects from the financial sector to 
the real sector. Introducing financial accelerator type propagation (see for instance 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchirst, 1999) mechanisms into otherwise standard 
DSGE models would possibly be a way ahead. While filling this challenging gap 
is deliberately left for future research, we believe our approach offers, 
nevertheless, a useful first step to combining modern general equilibrium macro 
models with financial stability analysis.  
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